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Taking people’s longevity as a measure of good life, humankind can proudly say that
the average person is living a much longer life than ever before. The AIDS epidemic
has however for the first time in decades stalled and in some cases even reverted
this trend in a number of countries. Climate change is increasingly becoming a
major challenge for food security and we can anticipate that hunger caused by crop
damages will become much more common.
Since many of the challenges humanity faced in the past were overcome by
inventive solutions coming from the life sciences, we are compelled to reconsider
how we incentivize science and technology development so that those in need can
benefit more broadly from scientific research. There is a huge portion of the world
population that is in urgent need for medicines to combat diseases that are
currently neglected by the scientific community and could immensely benefit from
agricultural research that specifically targets their environmental conditions. At the
same time efforts have to be made to make the fruits of current and future research
more widely accessible. These changes would have to be backed by a range of
moral arguments to attract people with diverging notions of global justice. This
article explores the main ethical theories used to demand a greater share in the
benefits from scientific progress for the poor. Since life sciences bring about a
number of special concerns, a short list of conflictive issues is also offered.
Keywords: Global justice; Intellectual property; Benefiting from science; Human
rights; Access to medicines
One of the most fundamental norms in human rights law is the principle of progres-
sive realization of all human rights.a Perhaps the most incontrovertible and shared
standard to measure progress towards achieving this goal is life expectancy. Since the
1950s a substantial rise in life expectancy can be observed all around the world. Con-
tributions to this remarkable achievement come from a wide range of quarters; how-
ever a crucial role can be attributed to the rapid development of the life sciences. In
the early post-war period a number of newly developed innovations in the life sciences
were made widely available, contributing to the eradication of some dreadful diseases
and making an immense increase in harvest yields possible.
Current developments are however challenging the progressive realization of human
rights worldwide. At the end of the 20th century, for the first time in decades, not war
but disease was responsible for lowering the average life expectancy in a number of2014 Timmermann; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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astating death toll that is reflected in a considerable reduction of the national average
life expectancy of various countries. In addition, hunger and malnutrition are endemic;
many experts prognosticate that climate change will impose a further threat to future
food security (Cline 2007). The state of some countries is so dire that the everyday term
“developing country” does not fit current realities any more. For many countries the
label “retrogressive societies” would be more suitable to describe the actual situation.
The reduction of average life expectancy in many countries is an undisputable sign
that one of the most sacred principles of human rights law, the principle of progressive
realization, is being violated, demanding urgent response. All disciplines capable of de-
livering solutions incur a moral obligation to contribute to the alleviation of these
problems.
Science and technology development have still a huge potential to address many of
the welfare issues currently at stake.b Optimal results can be reached when research
agendas are aligned to meet the needs of the worst off. Unfortunately, research efforts
destined to meet the global poor’s needs are insufficient and many of the inventions
that could help addressing the problems of the poor are priced out of their financial
reach. The scientific community is currently neglecting a number of diseases and much
research still needs to be done to improve tropical agriculture.
Those problems are partly due to the fact that it has become customary to incentivize
research and development by granting temporary exclusive rights to innovators. Many
vital medicines and innovations in agriculture are subject to those rights and sold at
higher than production prices to allow innovators to recoup research and development
costs. Extreme inequality makes the development of products for the desires of the rich
much more profitable than it is to address the problems of the poor.
Since allowing the global poor to benefit from scientific and technological develop-
ment in agriculture and medicine more widely can play such a crucial role in improving
human welfare, we will first examine the main arguments that defend temporary exclu-
sivity. As innovation in the life sciences brings about a series of extra considerations
that need to be addressed, we will briefly list some of these issues in the second part.
The third section will analyse the ethical theories used to bring research agendas more
in line with the needs of the poor and to make innovations accessible.
Justifications for temporary exclusivity
The function of intellectual property rights is primarily instrumental: it is a societal tool
to stimulate innovation. Depending upon the type of creative work a variety of incen-
tive mechanisms have been institutionalized. Examples thereof are copyright, patents,
geographic indications and plant breeders’ rights. In addition, trademarks are protected
to help manufacturers maintain a clientele by providing products that retain certain
quality standards and characteristics. Trade secret laws set some limitations on how far
employees of one company may share their acquired knowledge with competitors.
One of the most prominent forms of intellectual property are patents. Having its
present-day origin in the second half of the fifteenth century in Venice, patents
were from the beginning conceived as a public-private bargain (Biagioli 2006; May
2007). Since its early days, patents were only granted to inventions that were both
new and useful. The exclusive rights were also temporary and alienable, and the
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quired patent holders to use the patent (a basic working requirement) in order to
retain its validity.c Only this last element has not been taken over by contemporary
patent law. Holders of exclusive rights are nowadays generally not required to make their
inventions or work publicly available and can up to a certain extent hinder third parties to
make such efforts.d
Granting temporary exclusive rights to innovators allows them to recoup research
and development costs, provided those costs were reasonable and the product devel-
oped can be sold and finds a large enough market. Inventors who can convincingly per-
suade investors to advance research expenses are given a tool to secure returns to the
investment and so are able to undertake their research. Those who have made a finan-
cial gain by making use of exclusive rights can, if they so wish, reinvest their capital in
further research activities.
The establishment of the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreemente in 1994 introduced a system for the global enforcement of intellectual
property rights with sanction possibilities for noncompliance. However, similarly to
its predecessors in national laws, rights are not absolute. The idea of compulsory licenses
is affirmed in the TRIPS agreement (article 31). The drafters of the TRIPS agreement as
well as the signatories of the Doha Declaration acknowledge that intellectual property
rights can clash with higher societal goals, most notoriously public health needs. Here sig-
natories agreed that in case of conflict, urgent public health interests supersede private in-
terests (Timmermann and van den Belt 2013).
The globalization of intellectual property rights was not the only event that changed
the legal landscape of exclusive rights during the last century. Since the second half of
last century, exclusive rights are less seen as privileges and more perceived as genuine
property entitlements.f This change in terminology is not a minor one, since property
entitlements are far more deeply anchored in society. Opponents of exclusive rights do
nowadays not only have to fight entitlements that are conceived mainly as instrumen-
tal, but also rights that terminologically fall under the umbrella of property rights. Vio-
lations of the latter right are generally perceived as less acceptable. There are two
major philosophical traditions that justify ownership of property by basing the encom-
passed rights on natural law and personality ties respectively.g
Natural rights
Following an interpretation of Locke’s material property theory, modern legal scholars
have translated the notion of having a natural right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour
directly into having a natural right to intellectual property.h According to this theory
there is nothing we are more entitled to call our own than our own bodies. Since we
mix labour, something that is inherently part of our own due to the indispensable bond
to our bodies, with the material we work with, we gain an entitlement to call the thing
we mix labour with our own (Locke 1689; Widerquist 2010). This is subject to two pro-
visos: the resources we mix labour with are unowned and there is enough and as good
left for others (Locke 1689; Child 1990). Retaining ownership titles is however still sub-
ject to a third proviso: non-wastage has to be avoided.i Similarly to reasoning found in
the early Venetian patent act, the idea that ownership titles should only cover objects
that are used is present in Lockean property theories.j
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fruits of one’s labour is hardly possible without having control over the object. Intan-
gible objects are different however, the object itself is not consumable, i.e. it can be
enjoyed by a number of people at the same time without diminishing it (cf. Attas
2008). Exclusive rights on the object are not necessary to enjoy the fruits of one’s intel-
lectual labour, at least when considering individual use. This changes however, if under
enjoying the fruit’s of our labour we also include charging monopoly rents from the use
of the invented object. Recognizing property makes charging rents possible, however
here we may undermine one of the main functions of property: to incentivize mixing
labour with the owned object (i.e. improving the asset). As soon as the practice of rent-
seeking is accepted, it becomes clear that the idea of abuse of rights has to be specified
(cf. van Donselaar 2009). The natural rights tradition has close ties to the notion of des-
ert, making issues of proportionality between benefiting from one’s own labour and
gaining from the efforts of others mandatory. Exorbitant rent-seeking may disincenti-
vize potential labourers to work on further improving the asset.
Personality theories
According to Hegelian personality theories we as individuals own our character traits,
talents and feelings (Moore 2011). While constructing or creating new objects we are
expressing ourselves and certain traits of our personality become attached to the devel-
oped objects. Having control over how one’s person is perceived requires therefore also
a certain power over the objects one has brought into existence. Property ownership is
one way to have such control. According to Hegel the recognition and possession of prop-
erty contribute to the extension of one’s personality (Hughes 1988). Exclusion would be
thus justified on the grounds that one sees the desired image of one’s personality in jeop-
ardy. Our legal tradition recognizes two elements that have strong ties to personality the-
ories. These are the right to attribution of authorship and the right to control the integrity
of one’s work as protected by copyright law.
Nonetheless, when it becomes possible to limit the diffusion of agricultural innovation
or block access to essential medicines solely on these grounds, we will have to seriously
question the social value of securing this individual interest. This type of reasoning is diffi-
cult to defend for objects other than artistic and literary creations.
We can trace some elements of both traditions in today’s intellectual property laws.
Keeping the right to have one’s name attached to an invention, or work of art, after sell-
ing it and being granted some control over the integrity of an artistic expression are as
mentioned clearly compatible with the Hegelian tradition. A clause that gives authors
control over the integrity of their work may impede a swift updating of scientific text-
books – conflicting with other societal interests (cf. Atenas and Havemann 2013). Simi-
larly, giving inventors the power to withhold an invention from the public is more
inspired by the natural rights tradition than incentive theories. The public benefits rarely
from inventions being kept out of reach.
Yet, the influence of these traditions has limits. Exclusive rights are only valid for a cer-
tain period of time and are not categorized as absolute – states retain the power to over-
ride these rights – a clear departure from the natural rights tradition (Sterckx 2005a).
Awareness of the philosophical roots of property theories and acknowledging that
temporary exclusivity is necessary to stimulate high-priced research and development
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have an innovation incentive system in place that applies the same rules for all, regard-
less of the field of technology, the purchasing power of the exclusive rights applicant or
the social acceptance of past licensing behaviour. Political economy may offer us the
missing argument. Incentivizing innovation with a one-size-fits-all mechanism creates
confidence for innovators and their investors by conveying the impression that rules
are simple and valid for all. When decisions made at the patent office are predictable,
uncertainties in investments are reduced, something that is highly valued by inventors
and investors.
In the next section we will shift our attention to the overall social costs of recogniz-
ing a one-size-fits-all system of intellectual property rights.k A first step to understand
the full consequences of such a societal decision is to examine a number of special
challenges brought up by temporary exclusivity over inventions in the life sciences. As
we will see, intellectual property law cannot claim neutrality by simply avoiding differ-
ential treatment of technologies. The design of the innovation incentive system has an
enormous effect on the kind of technologies that will be developed, who will be able to
afford these products, who is included in the innovation processes and lastly who will
draw the biggest benefits.
Patents that are tightly linked to genetic resources make temporary exclusivity more
problematic as often competing innovators will have to seek licenses to secure
freedom-to-operate. This partial control over follow-up innovation raises a problem of
justice when research output is inaccessible for the poor, the chances for start-up com-
panies restricted and research ends up disproportionally oriented towards the wishes of
the rich. The design of innovation incentive systems has to take into consideration that
we live in a world of extreme inequalities. Market incentives are determined by what
people are prepared to pay and not according to what people are able to pay. A system
that is supposedly in place for the benefit of all should not lead to outrageous advan-
tages for few. Exclusive rights affect a much wider group than those using and produ-
cing technologies.
Special challenges raised by the life sciences
The privatization of knowledge in the life sciences raises a number of additional diffi-
culties. Living organisms are evolving at different degrees and paces, ranging from millions
of years to a number of generations, and constantly adapting to changing environments.
Our creative minds have continuously adjusted to those fluctuations by developing new
medicines, pest control methods and seed varieties. In addition, a number of new biotech-
nologies are developed to make human lives more comfortable. We thus have a variety of
systems evolving in different directions and a legal apparatus trying to keep up with these
developments.
Global trade favours a harmonized legal protection system and widely shared notions
of justice demand that such system is democratically backed. Under such constraints
the innovation incentive system can hardly evolve parallel to biotechnological develop-
ments and the new conditions set out by the changing environment. Biological systems
and human imagination are very dynamic and evolve to a great extent autonomously
following own impulses. Legal systems have to cover the vast majority of possible cases,
work towards simplicity and in a globalized world also aim for homogeneity.
Timmermann Life Sciences, Society and Policy 2014, 10:8 Page 6 of 20
http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/10/1/8A second group of problems is caused by individual profit maximization. Some of the
strategies pursued by economically rational agents conflict with social targets such as
combating disease and malnutrition. Depending on sales and licensing practices, exclu-
sive rights can hinder access to objects of innovation that could secure such essential
rights as the human rights to health and food (ICESCR, art. 11 and 12).
While the problem of access has gained prominence, it is only one of the many issues
that need to be addressed. Having exclusive rights on specific uses of genetic resources
may hamper innovation if patent holders pursue a restrictive licensing behaviour. Al-
though the principle of patents is to make knowledge more accessible by giving patent
holders greater control over the knowledge they claim as their own, there are repeated
cases where this is not the outcome, as mentioned earlier. Through the use of temporary
exclusive rights many inventions are made inaccessible regardless of what consumers are
willing to pay. Compulsory licenses are the lawmaker’s remedy for such cases, but in prac-
tice they are hardly ever pursued. The public interest has to be substantial for such type
of licensing to be considered a viable option (Hollis and Pogge 2008).
The list of conflicting issues is even longer. One of the reasons why the patent system
was established is to provide an alternative to trade secrecy. Temporary exclusive rights
are granted to those who disclose in their patent application all necessary information
to carry out (i.e. reproduce) an invention. Society recognizes temporary exclusivity in
order to have access to the knowledge withheld in a patent document once the 20-year
exclusivity period expires. This type of agreement is often referred to as the patent bar-
gain (cf. Murray 2006). Some innovations in the life sciences however cut the public
out of their share. As we will see in two of the following sections, a number of inven-
tions become useless over time or are prohibited once long-term side-effects are visible.
The inventor enjoyed temporary exclusivity without contributing to society useful
knowledge for public exploitation.
Every field of technology and science has its special problems when it comes to pat-
ents. We will examine eight difficulties, some of which are specific to the field of life
sciences: (1) the impossibility to invent around some inventions, (2) the problem of patent
thickets, (3) the welfare costs of temporary delays, (4) the function and effect of biodiver-
sity, (5) how living materials react to the environment, (6) the self-multiplication of inven-
tions, (7) the necessity of speedy sharing of data and samples during emergencies and
lastly (8) the issue of biosafety.
Impossibility to invent around
A general additional advantage of patents is that once an invention proves profitable a
number of people will be motivated to offer similar solutions. Those who do not want
to acquire a license from the patent holder will attempt to provide a technical
innovation that has comparable functions but is distinguishable enough to qualify as a
new invention and thus also be patentable. The advantage hereof for society is that the
original monopoly high prices are in practice reduced by the proliferation of competing
products. This competition incentivizes the original inventor to increase the sophistica-
tion of her original product and thus further increases competition, which again brings
an advantage to society.
Patents that are closely tied to uses of biological material impede competing innova-
tors to offer similar solutions as the requirement to obtain a license becomes inevitable
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limitation by buying patents for the sole purpose of charging exorbitant licensing fees
to biotechnological firms and institutes, often stalling innovation (cf. Heller 2008).
Patent thickets
Some objects of innovations are covered by a large number of patents. When the patents
have different owners with diverging conceptions of the market and scientific value of
each patent, we often encounter so-called “patent thickets”. A textbook example hereof
is the “golden rice” case. Licenses for nearly 70 patents had to be cleared out before the
genetically modified rice could be marketed (van den Belt 2003; Wilson 2007).
Temporality of delays
Particularly in the life sciences what for some counts as a temporary exclusion means
to many permanent exclusion. Treatment that comes late is often inefficacious. Late ac-
cess to medicines or vaccines may mean death or the suffering of a disease. As far as
public health and food security is concerned, it is often suboptimal to have one group
having early access to an innovation and another second group to have access only after
generics become available. The eradication of pathogens demands widespread coordi-
nated action.
Biodiversity
In order to be able to apply for intellectual property protection the object of innovation
has to be stable and uniform to meet the industrial application requirement for patent-
ability (TRIPS, art. 27.1) or to qualify for plant breeders’ rights (International Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1991, art. 5.1). Small farmers who engage
in seed exchange practices identify and select a number of plant varieties according
to specific traits producing a heterogeneous output and thus adding to agrobiodi-
versity (cf. Louwaars 2007; Schmietow 2012). This type of intellectual work can gener-
ally not be protected through the use of intellectual property law.l As a consequence,
those who want to apply for exclusive rights will innovate in such a way that they produce
a stable and uniform output. Further, the selling of protected seed varieties is lucrative.
Economically rational sales practices will include a number of outreach programmes,
lobbying activities and negotiations with food retailers to drive farmers to use commercial
seed varieties. This behaviour brings genetic erosion with it, as much of agrobiodiversity
gets lost when farmers discontinue to use traditional seeds (De Schutter 2011).
Biodiversity has also its negative counterpart, not only useful plants have a heteroge-
neous genetic makeup, but also pathogens. The same active ingredient that combats a
pathogen prevalent in the developed world does sometimes not have the same efficacy
with pathogens prevalent in the developing world.m
Living material reacts to its environment
As mentioned, one of the arguments that justify the existence of patents is that inventors
disclose a huge amount of information in patent documents (TRIPS, art. 29.1) and that
this information becomes part of the public domain once the patent expires. Patent data-
bases are therefore seen as a huge source of knowledge. In the legal, philosophical and
economic discourse it is assumed that knowledge is a good of non-rivalrous consumption,
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without diminishing it (Stiglitz 2008). Living organisms are however not stable. Climate
change makes many crops useless. Organisms that are combated often develop resistance
to the agent with whom it fights. The consequence of the latter is that many herbicides,
antibiotics, antifungi and pesticides become ineffective over time. For whoever holds a pa-
tent for such type of objects, profit-maximization would dictate to either sell to a small
number of high-paying customers or to overexploit the active agent without regard for
the development of resistance. In case of overexploitation, the active agent may become
useless once temporary exclusive rights elapse. The public will not have an effective gen-
eric product available and be obliged to pay for a newly developed patented product. An
incentive mechanism to conserve those resources is missing (Outterson 2005; Anomaly
2010). If those resources are not conserved the public misses out its share of the patent
bargain: valuable knowledge entering the public domain.
Self-multiplication
Unlike in other fields, some innovations in biotechnology have the ability to self-
reproduce. A prominent case is genetically-modified plants that have genes inserted
whose use is protected by patents. Who is responsible for the reproductive behaviour of
plants protected by exclusive rights? In the case of a plant variety that has a patented
gene sequence a much-debated court case illustrates the complexities involved. The
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser case has created a severe turmoil by deciding in
favour of the agrochemical company (van den Belt 2009). Even by taking proper mea-
sures, it is difficult to avoid genetic contamination, as many organic farmers experience.
Speedy sharing of data and samples in global emergencies
The impossibility to seal national borders hermetically demands that we have respon-
sive mechanisms to enable the swift sharing of data and samples concerning public
health and food security threats in place. The world we now live in hosts many more
people than ever before. Overcrowded prisons are already a public health hazard
(Møller et al. 2007). In so-called “hotspots” we encounter an extremely high population
density living closely together with animals. As those areas are situated mostly in trop-
ical regions, the humidity and heat provide ideal conditions for the emergence of new
pathogens.n An additional threat for the containment of diseases is the high mobility of
people globally, which leads to the intercontinental propagation of diseases within
hours.o
Intellectual property has a negative effect on the spirit of free sharing. Countries who
voluntarily shared samples find themselves paying huge sums of money for medication
that could not have been developed without their contribution.p This is felt as an in-
justice that demotivates people to continue to share samples without clear agreements
securing returns.
Biosafety
Inventions rarely affect only technology producers and technology users, but usually also
society at large. In the case those effects are negative, efforts have to be made to contain
any undesired side-effects. Being able to exclusively exploit a technology in a given time-
frame can make taking risks (or being risk adverse) lucrative. Not having basic needs
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able and far better than nothing are abandoned because they do not meet the safety stan-
dards of the Global North, harmonization of safety standards becomes a justice problem.
Biosafety regulation also affects the abovementioned patent bargain. Data submitted
to biosafety regulation agencies is increasingly considered a private good (FAO &
WHO 2010) and thus rarely accessible for independent testing by non-public institu-
tions. In a number of cases patents are being used to forbid research on biotechnologies
(Biddle 2014). Once exclusive rights elapse, a much wider range of stakeholders examines
the submitted data. Many pesticides that were protected by exclusive rights thus become
prohibited by the time generic versions can be freely manufactured because of more ex-
tensive biosafety control. Farmers are thus compelled to buy new products that are cov-
ered by patent rights.
Increasingly biosafety tests involving human subjects are carried out in lower- and
middle-income countries. When objects that are improved and developed using this
data are not accessible to the average biosafety trials participant we have good grounds
for morally rejecting their involvement (cf. Wenner 2013).
In this section we observed that exclusive rights in the life sciences act as an add-
itional hurdle in allowing people to participate in science, in making the benefits of sci-
entific advancement accessible and for encouraging scientists to follow a direction that
will help to solve the problems of the worst-off. As we saw, the poor are not receiving
their share on what could be considered common heritage to mankind. Major corpora-
tions are tapping resources conserved and improved in the developing world without
fairly compensating indigenous communities for their input. And lastly, exclusive rights
are regularly used to block competitors through expensive legal battles instead of merely
to secure funds for future research that could benefit society at large (cf. Sterckx 2005b).
Incentivizing innovation and cosmopolitan conceptions of justice
Hardly anyone would nowadays endorse Leibniz’ statement that we live in the best of
all possible worlds, at least when taking political realities as constitutive. There is ample
room to make this world a better place. First, we live in a world of extreme inequalities.
To take an example, in 2012 the combined gross domestic product of the 846.5 million
people living in the low-income countries amounted to almost the same then the one
reached by the five million inhabitants of Norway.q There are enough resources in the
world to eradicate severe poverty. In relation to hunger, it is long-known, that misdis-
tribution and not an absolute food shortage is the main cause of famine (Sen 1981).
Second, many of the global institutional arrangements predominantly benefit the richer
countries of the world and come at a significant concrete and opportunity cost for the
poor (Pogge 2008, 2010). And third – the subject of this writing – science and technol-
ogy could be incentivized in a way that would far better benefit those with the most ur-
gent needs. The life sciences, being tightly linked to food security and global health,
have a gigantic opportunity to develop solutions for those in need.
Reducing suffering around the world to less disgraceful levels is a Herculean task. We
currently face an annual death toll of 18 million people worldwide from poverty-related
causes that is largely avoidable (Pogge 2008). It is estimated that 12.5% of the world popu-
lation is undernourished (FAO, WFP and IFAD 2012). Vitamin and mineral deficiencies
are causing irreparable damages to the health of hundreds of millions, hindering full brain
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has developed a certain apathy to see behind those evils merely numbers.
An increased global population has also made it mandatory to live more sustainable
lifestyles. Climate change is threatening future food security (Cline 2007).s Rising aver-
age temperatures are enlarging the area where tropical diseases are prevalent. As those
diseases are neglected in pharmaceutical research we will be confronted with a huge
global health problem. Pollution is affecting many areas in the world with severe effects
on public health.
Even after acknowledging that tackling those problems could take more than a gener-
ation of well-intentioned people, we can still retain a glimpse of optimism and recall
some of the remarkable achievements humankind made with the help of life sciences.t
Over the past 50 years yields in agriculture have been increased by over 130% mainly
due to the immense amount of resources spent on agricultural research (Baulcombe
et al. 2009). The world is now feeding many more people than at any time in history
(De Schutter 2011). Some deadly diseases, such as smallpox are considered eradicated
(Flory and Kitcher 2004), polio is close to be completely eradicated and others are not
a threat to human life anymore.u
The current institutional order is designed in such a way, that the mere participation
in it makes people responsible of harming others (cf. Pogge 2008). By paying taxes and
buying new products we sustain a market economy that has substantial negative effects
on the poor. Nonetheless, those who come up with technological innovations are not
the only ones maintaining such regimes nor can they be fully blamed for the harms the
poor are facing. Out of fairness, they should not be the only ones burdened with ad-
dressing global welfare problems. Further, global poverty is not a problem caused by a
single generation.
Important is to mention that it is essential to human nature to improve one’s living
situation and we also recognize this as a human right (UDHR, art. 11.1). Making a sin-
gle generation pay for all the negligence of past generations also raises issues of justice.
Over-burdening one generation will limit their possibility to improve their own
situation.
Prominent moral theories vary greatly in respect to how we should balance the short-
term interests of the better-off with the urgent needs of the poor and the medium- to
long-term eradication of severe poverty. We will now explore six positions that aim at
redressing the current situation as a matter of justice and one approach that condemns
the actual situation for corrupting the norms of science.
Weighing benefits
People who are below a certain welfare threshold are much easier to satisfy than those
who already live in prosperity. To take a very basic example: giving one euro to the per-
son earning a hundred euros a day will not significantly enhance her well-being. On
the other side, giving the same euro to one of the many people who earns one euro a
day will significantly help her. This is reason enough to prefer the latter person as a re-
cipient for most utilitarians (see generally for this type of reasoning Singer 1993). Maxi-
mizing global welfare would require distributing resources to those who can convert
them in welfare – either for themselves or for others – more efficiently (cf. Derclaye
2012). People who are in severe distress can already be helped with minor attentions.
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transforming resources into happiness (Derclaye 2013).
Transferring this principle to the subject of innovation, a thinker like Peter Singer
would condemn the situation where research efforts are spent to produce an add-
itional shaving cream for an already large menu of product choices, while diseases
that afflict the lives of millions of people receive hardly any scientific attention. A situ-
ation where 90% of the global resources are spent in addressing the health problems
of 10% of the world population becomes unacceptable, as it is a highly inefficient
form of increasing aggregated global welfare (Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working
Group 2001).
Compensatory duties
Our global trade regimes, especially the TRIPS agreement, disproportionally benefit the
developed world while adding significant disadvantages for the poor. The democratic
legitimacy of the TRIPS agreement has been severely criticized. The negotiation docu-
ments were so complex that they could hardly be analysed by countries lacking strong
legal expertise (cf. Drahos and Braithwaite 2003; Pogge 2008). With this treaty, Pogge
argues, developed countries have made themselves guilty of imposing a harmful regime
on others, thus violating the negative duty not to inflict harm. Continuing with politics
as usual demands from us compensatory duties. Therefore we are obliged to establish
institutions whose positive effects outweigh the negative effects caused by existing insti-
tutions. Thomas Pogge’s most known example of such type of institutions is the Health
Impact Fund (Hollis and Pogge 2008). This proposal seeks to collect sufficient funds to re-
munerate pharmaceutical companies through a mechanism that maximizes the quality-
adjusted life years of newly developed medicines. Through this fund accessibility and
availability of medicines could be improved.
A similar line of thinking is prevalent in climate change negotiations. Harming others
through carbon emissions is seen as inevitable. Nevertheless harming without compen-
sating is judged as worse than harming while compensating. The transfer of technology
is often presented and demanded as a form of compensation.
Basic rights
Before being able to enjoy a wider set of liberties it is necessary to have some basic
needs met. Subsistence, security and liberty are all elements that fall under the category
of basic rights (cf. Shue 1996).v Entitlements such as freedom from hunger and disease
are examples of those rights. The basic rights doctrine aims at securing subsistence
needs at a very elemental level, standards well below thresholds aimed by the Inter-
national Bill of Rights.w While freedom from hunger is targeted by the basic rights doc-
trine, the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights article 12.1
seeks to guarantee not only a freedom from hunger, but also a right to adequate food.
An official comment on the right to adequate food states explicitly that this right shall
“not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with a minimum
package of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients” (UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 1999). This comment states that cultural and consumer accept-
ability should be taken into consideration (idem). Similarly the right to health is also not
interpreted as freedom from disease, but as the right to the highest attainable standard of
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2000).
A person can start to regularly enjoy other rights once her basic rights are considered
secured. The basic rights doctrine seeks to secure the fundamental freedoms and enti-
tlements for a person to be able to play a constructive role in society, without taking
into consideration if the played role is the one the individual had in mind or wishes to
continue to play. Important is here that the person is physically able to undertake this
function. However, limiting duties to safeguard only such basic necessities is strongly
criticized. We do not need to abide by such extreme positions. As mentioned earlier, in
relation to food Amartya Sen has demonstrated that not scarcity but misdistribution is
the principal cause of famine (Sen 1981). There are enough resources to considerably
expand the freedoms people can pursue.
As far as innovation is concerned, the basic rights doctrine is a powerful tool to argue
that access to some innovations takes precedence over the material interests of innova-
tors. There are however some limitations. The link between the object of innovation
and the intended outcome has to be strong, e.g. as far as health is concerned a medi-
cine has to be crucial to recover from a disease. Objects that would considerably im-
prove living conditions but are not vital for subsistence would still have to be balanced
with other rights and interests. As long as an object of innovation is necessary to en-
sure subsistence society can make claims on it, this counts also for objects that become
available in the future. The World Health Organization, working with a concept of es-
sential medicines, still demands access to new medicines and repeatedly states the need
for further research. The Organization constantly reviews its list, taking into consider-
ation the state of knowledge and innovation as well as the propagation of pathogens
and disorders (WHO Expert Committee on the Selection Use of Essential Medicines
2012). When objects of innovation are merely helpful, but not indispensable to reach
an intended outcome, as is the case with most of agricultural innovation, the basic
needs doctrine loses strength.
Human rights and capabilities
The human rights discourse and the capabilities approach are interested in securing
considerably more than just subsistence needs and freedom from repression. The two
approaches have some differences, but offering opportunities to develop for people and
communities is central in both discourses (cf. Nussbaum 1997). Development is under-
stood in terms of human flourishing and this in multiple dimensions. People should
also have the opportunities to participate in scientific and cultural life, benefit from the
advancement of science, express themselves freely, enjoy leisure time, have a say on
matters that affect their lives, among others. When addressing such an ample catalogue
of rights, the opportunities innovation has to secure these rights will also be much larger
(cf. Sunder 2012). Access to many more objects can be claimed in virtue of their ability to
enhance full human functioning. A wider catalogue of rights that have to be pursued as a
whole also enlists science to fulfilling many more tasks. It strongly demands solutions for
the problems that afflict the needy (cf. Korthals and Timmermann 2012).
Living in a world where science and technology play such an enormous role also creates
an ethical obligation to make science and the development of technologies a more inclu-
sive endeavour (Timmermann 2013). Participating in such endeavours allows people to
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Educating a sufficient number of citizens to such expertise is vital for society’s self-
determination. Science is also part of cultural life and as such human rights law protects a
right to participate in such endeavours (Shaheed 2012). Using intellectual property to con-
trol follow-up innovation and to limit the possibilities to participate in the life sciences is
therefore condemned.
It becomes important to recall that the International Bill of Rights has global legitim-
acy. The rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are based on agreement. A general agreement on the fun-
damental rights and entitlements of all human beings should help each individual to
pursue their ideal of a good life in harmony with others worldwide. Extensive as those
rights are, extensive is the agreement on people being entitled to them. The lists of cen-
tral human capabilities do not count with such democratic legitimation, but nonethe-
less many of the targets identified by capability theorists have their pendants in human
rights law (Nussbaum 1997; Marks 2011).
Human rights law and many international organizations have been very clear on the
importance of technical and scientific international cooperation (e.g. regarding food se-
curity, see ICESCR, art. 11.2). The harms that afflict the poor and major environmental
problems should not be seen as problems that solely perturb the countries where those
issues are present.x
Recognition theories
The fundamental concept behind recognition theories can be found in Hegel’s memor-
able words “they recognize each other as mutually recognizing one another” (Hegel
1807/1970). It is hardly surprising, then, that this small statement has attracted the at-
tention of countless scholars. According to an interpretation of this passage, action that
nurtures recognition has to be simultaneous, reciprocal, transitive, reflexive and sym-
metrical (Limmer 2005). Hence, a distinctive trait of this approach is the possibility to
condemn relations of dependency and of one-sided influence. A contemporary repre-
sentative of this tradition, Nancy Fraser, has specified the importance of being able to
participate as a peer (Fraser 1998). In the context of science and technology development
this can be interpreted as making research efforts more inclusive, in formally recognizing
parties that where vital in bringing out a new product and in not systematically discrimin-
ating certain research contributions without good arguments. Therefore, recognition the-
ories are a powerful tool to demand that inventive capacities of indigenous communities
are publicly recognized (cf. Heins 2008; Dübgen 2012). Making the possibility of mutual
influence imperative provides a justification for capacity-building efforts.
(Re)claiming the commons
In the realm of science and technology, innovation rarely comes out of thin air (Hettinger
1989). Access to prior knowledge and data is vital for the inventive mind and we greatly
rely on what previous researchers have observed, catalogued, described, refuted, disco-
vered and invented. Setting boundaries to the use of knowledge and biomaterials by gran-
ting exclusive rights becomes increasingly restrictive for competing researchers. Many
researchers from poorer institutes or those whose research area has a high patent density
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when making remixes or collages. This general problem has motivated a number of scho-
lars to defend the public domain and common-pool resources, in order to secure the
“building blocks” for future creativity.y Those “building blocks” are essential for the con-
tinuous improvement of living conditions and to secure creative liberty. The defence of a
commons of genetic resources has received much scholarly attention during the last years
(see Kloppenburg 2010; Lemmens 2013; Deibel 2014).
Scientific values
A widely shared conception of the so-called scientific ethos has been propounded by
Robert Merton. He mentions four elements: communism (later communalism, in the
sense of being community-centred), universalism, disinterestedness and organized scep-
ticism (Merton 1973; van den Belt 2010). Especially philosophers of science have been
accusing intellectual property for corrupting the scientific ethos. Intellectual property
allows one to block access to the datasets on which one’s scientific contribution is based.
Copyright protection enables journal publishers to charge high prices for subscriptions.
Lack of access to new scientific contributions limits the possibility of universal valid-
ation (Biddle 2014). The principle of universalism demands validation outside one’s
close circle of colleagues. A second demand of the principle of universalism is that ca-
reers be open to talents. Intellectual property fosters an environment where research av-
enues are barred, making it much more difficult for outsiders to prove themselves as
talented. The ideal of communism calls for a common ownership of research results. It
highlights the importance previous findings have for future knowledge production. Rec-
ognition and esteem of individual contributors is something that is still considered pru-
dential, since they function as incentives. Here again the power patent holders have to
control follow-up innovation is something that is condemned by followers of this trad-
ition. They further point out that both the ideals of disinterestedness and organized
scepticism are difficult to follow when financial stakes are high (Flory and Kitcher 2004).
By making specific scientific innovations profitable, intellectual property creates an en-
vironment where people over- or undervalue certain inventions for other than scientific
reasons.z
In the benefiting from scientific and technological progress context the Mertonian
scientific ethos demands research results to be accessible for all, not forgetting research
institutes in the developing world. Knowledge should not be locked-up in order to
maintain the profitability of obsolete products or second-best solutions. Arguably, some
followers of this scientific ethos would also demand a fairer evaluation of the value of
traditional knowledge.
Conclusion
This article examined the main arguments used to justify knowledge exclusivity, that is,
to withhold knowledge from the public domain (even if “only” temporarily). Thereafter,
some peculiarities that have to be taken into consideration when dealing with the life
sciences were addressed. The third section discussed the central ethical theories used
to argue for a wider distribution of the benefits from scientific progress.
A central problem of intellectual property law is that especially after the 1994 TRIPS
agreement and subsequent bilateral trade negotiations it has become (almost) neutral
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judgements on the goods science and technology development is delivering, as well as
on the circumstances under which these goods are being produced.
First, while there is a broad agreement on the idea that innovators should benefit
from intellectual labour, the public nevertheless is interested in maintaining a balance
between deserved profits and the taking of immoderate advantages. As discussed earl-
ier, especially in biotechnology patent holders can block innovations from reaching the
public without delivering equivalent alternatives. Yet civil society generally rejects any
practices that resemble the establishments of cartels, such as limiting market competi-
tion, abusive pricing and blocking fair opportunities for newcomers. Further, objects of
innovations in the life sciences not only satisfy consumers’ wishes, but often are neces-
sities for the avoidance of hunger and disease. Exorbitant profits come seldom without
casualties.
Concerning the second issue, the public is also not neutral towards what science is
producing. The time where scientists could serenely satisfy their curiosity is long gone,
if it ever truly existed (cf. Kitcher 2004; Reynolds 2010). Life sciences’ past successes
have engendered in the public the idea that science can do much more to alleviate the
huge welfare problems we currently face around the globe. Both self-interest and sym-
pathy towards the worst-off motivate people to fight the current status quo. In a global-
ized world we share a number of hazards that do not respect national borderlines:
infectious diseases, plant pathogens and climate change. Extreme poverty in one place
of the world can lead to a public health hazard in the opposite part of the world. As far
as sympathy towards the needy concerns, different notions of justice vary in great ex-
tent to what degree and at what speed we should address extreme deprivation. And, as
mentioned earlier, some theories of justice do not content themselves in the absence of
suffering but are actively set to promote well-being.
It is difficult to say which ethical theory or normative standpoint should be favoured.
This is not necessary a negative outcome – the advocacy of a wide range of theories
has led to a very fruitful debate. A plurality of ethical approaches is the best way to do
justice to the heterogeneity in human needs and cravings as well as the complexities
within the fields of science and technology (cf. Resnik 2003).
Nonetheless, we have good reasons to promote a more inclusive innovation system.
Under some circumstances the strategic use of patents allows companies to block the
advancement of science and competing innovators. We can safely assume that as long
as it is economically rational for single companies to block innovation, it will continue
to happen. This type of behaviour goes strongly against a widely shared human value:
equality of opportunity.
When aiming to include a wider range of people in scientific enterprises, the capabil-
ities and human rights approach supported by some elements of recognition theories
have a strong potential (Timmermann 2013; Papaioannou). Building up research capaci-
ties is not only important as it allows people to participate in a fundamental part of cul-
tural life (i.e. the culture of science), but also for a variety of instrumental reasons.
Enabling more people to participate in science and technology development around the
world increases the chances that technologies that are culturally and socially acceptable
and adequate are produced. The geographic diversification of research outlets allows the
manufacture of complex marketable products bringing larger revenues to the different
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ences demands that countries that import the resulting goods are fabricating products of
similar commercial value to sustainably acquire these essential goods.aa
Whatever approach one considers as prudent, it is important to extensively engage
with a central issue mentioned earlier: we live in a world of extreme inequalities. This
has enormous consequences for the poor. The poor do not only suffer from being poor,
but also from being so much poorer than the rich: as Thomas Pogge notes, researchers
from poorer countries have already started to shift agendas to address richer markets.bb
Satisfying sophisticated appetites of people living in the developed world is economic-
ally much more profitable for commercial entities than addressing the urgent needs of
the poor. The developed world has a huge advantage due to its technological head-
start. Established research networks and sophisticated patented research tools give the
developed world an enormous advantage to excel in whatever field of research is
discovered in the future (Timmermann and van den Belt 2012). Under such extreme
inequalities hard work and ingenuity alone will not be sufficient for the Global South
to catch up. A substantial change in attitude is needed. Creativity and inventiveness
coming from the Global South has to be valued for its own virtues and incorporated in
a global innovation system. This way both the Global South and the developed world
will mutually benefit from working together.
Endnotes
aSee International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966,
hereinafter ICESCR), art. 2.1. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (1990).
bWhile concentrating here on intellectual property, the problem of absorbing the full
potential of biotechnology is much broader, ranging from trade issues to societal trust
in corporate science, an extensive literature overview is offered by Juma (2005).
cMay (2007), referring to Mandich (1948).
dPatents have nowadays also new uses. A so-called destructive use of patents occurs
when patent holders use their exclusive rights to hinder innovation and the diffusion of
improved competing products. The goal thereof is often to keep a high demand on
older profitable products, on new uses of patents see Schneider (2010) pp. 125 ff.
eTrade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (1994), hereinafter
TRIPS.
fIntellectual property as an umbrella concept dates back to the 1950s. Copyright has
been understood as property for a far longer time, see Hughes (2011).
gSome authors also justify property as a mean to secure a “just reward”. A brief ex-
position and criticism of this type of argument is offered by Papaioannou (2006).
hFor the complexity of this transition, see Hughes (1988) pp. 296–329 and Drahos
(1996) pp. 41-72.
iIn the realm of intangible property we may ponder if the “recklessly suboptimal use
of resources” should be understood as wastage, see Attas (2008) p. 47 and also Sterckx
(2005b).
jThe introduction of money however makes the accumulation of wealth possible
without spoilage. There are strong differences in opinion about the ultimate implica-
tions of the introduction of money for Lockean property theories, see Uberti (2013).
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http://www.lsspjournal.com/content/10/1/8kTo be more precise, the one-size-fits-all mechanism in the life sciences consists
of three different incentive systems: patents, plant breeders’ rights and up to a
certain extent geographical indications. In some cases additional market domin-
ance can be secured by the strategic use of database rights, depending on national
legislation.
lIn some geographic areas this type of work might be incentivized through protected
geographic indications, but this will be limited to a small number of products. On geo-
graphic indications, see Raustiala and Munzer (2007).
mOne example is the vaccine developed to fight the human papillomavirus, see
Timmermann and van den Belt (2013) fn. 46.
nSome densely populated areas in the developed world also qualify as “hotspots”, see
Jones et al. (2008).
oA duty to share data related to public health emergencies is defended by Langat
et al. (2011).
pIn 2007 Indonesia stopped providing flu samples because the government feared
that industry in the developed world would develop vaccines without providing any
returns for the country, see The Royal Society (2012) p. 18.
qNumbers taken from http://data.worldbank.org/ (Accessed November 10, 2013).
rOver 30% of the world population suffers micronutrient deficiencies, see FAO, WFP
and IFAD (2012) p. 23.
sOn problems making agricultural innovation accessible for climate change adapta-
tion, see Timmermann et al. (2010).
tSystematic observations and experimentations made by people living in indigenous
communities are also considered scientific unless specified otherwise.
uDetails about the current program of worldwide polio eradication can be found
under http://www.polioeradication.org/.
vHowever Henry Shue’s approach is distinctive, since he considers a right to partici-
pation also as a basic right, see idem pp. 65-87.
wAs commonplace in the literature, I will use the term International Bill of Rights to
encompass the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
xThis point has been reaffirmed by a number of declarations at the turn of the cen-
tury, perhaps most prominently by the UN Millennium Development Goals.
ycf. e.g. for music see Boyle (2008) pp. 122-159, for synthetic biology see van den Belt
(2012).
zfor examples on biomedical research, see Reiss (2010).
aaThe relation between the right to food and purchasing power is explored in detail
in De Schutter (2009).
bbOn the Indian pharmaceutical industry, see Pogge (2008) p. 231.
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